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Juan Carlos Colin 
4545 ArthentonDr #122 
Taylosville, Utah 84123 
Petitioner/Appellant in/x» M. 
Case No. 20070211-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JUAN CARLOS COLIN, * PETITIONER'S REPLY TO 
Petitioner/Appellee * RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF APPELLANT. 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, * APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING A 
Respondent/Appellant. * PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, 
* IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
* SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
* JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING. 
Petitioner hereby submits this reply to Respondent's Brief of Appellant which appeals 
the granting of a petition for post-conviction relief dated February 27,2007. 
This is a very simple case turning on the question of whether the post-conviction court 
properly evaluated all avenues of law before ruling on the merits of the petition. The 
answer is "yes". 
For these reason, and further reasons detailed below, Petitioner respectfully asks this 
Court of Appeals to uphold the well-reasoned decision of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable John Paul Kennedy Presiding Judge. 
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L INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Notwithstanding the various arguments advanced by the Respondent, this remain a 
very simple case. Respondent argues the trial court erred by granting a petition for 
post-conviction relief at a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, without giving the 
State the opportunity to respond to the merits of the petition. (Brief of Appellant at 2). 
Assuming arguendo Respondent was not giving the opportunity to answer or 
otherwise respond on the merits of Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief, this 
Court of Appeals must consider first whether the trial court evaluated all avenues 
before ruling on the question. &» State v. Smith, 2003 UT App. 52, || 12, 65 P.3d 648 
("We review this claim as a matter of law."); &$ a&o State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
174 (Utah App. 1992)(an appellate court "determine[s] as a matter of law whether 
procedural error occurred."). 
Furthermore, Respondent argues prejudice by the trial court's denial of evidentiary 
hearing to present testimony and/or evidence on the merits. 
The crux of the appeal, therefore, is whether the post-conviction court properly 
granted post-conviction relief by ruled that: 1) the petition is timely; 2) it met the 
interest of justice exception, and; 3) because the testimony of Respondent's witness 
[Mr. Quinlan former defense counsel of Petitioner] would not add anything more than 
the Respondent proffer, the evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 
Thus, absent the proposed testimony-in-court of Mr. Quinlan, and the court's 
maximum benefit given to the Respondent proffer, this Court of Appeals should 
reject the idea that Respondent was prejudiced because he could have obtained further 
testimony and/or an affidavit from Mr. Quinlan for consideration on the merits. 
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Because Respondent recognized-in-court that Mr. Quinlan stated him that he does 
not remember this case specifically, since it's happen ten years ago, and no reason 
appears why it [the Respondent] could not have introduced sufficient evidence to 
sustain his burden, Petitioner respectfully asks this Court of Appeals to uphold the 
well-reasoned decision of the Honorable District Court Judge and to dismiss the 
Respondent appeal. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE PETITION IS TIMELY BROUGHT AFTER MR. COLIN BECAME 
AWARE OF THE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION. 
Utah has a myriad of procedures to correcting improperly entered criminal orders; 
to collaterally challenge a conviction, a criminal defendant need not faithfully comply 
with the requirements for Post-Conviction Relief under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 65C. First, a litigant in Utah is at liberty as s/he deems fit to style 
his motion or pleading, including one collaterally attacking a criminal conviction. Sm 
Renn v. Utah Board of Pardon, 904 P2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995)("We are not bound, 
however, by Renn's characterization of his petition for an extra-ordinary writ.... We 
will look to the substance of the action and the nature of the relief sought in 
determining the true nature of the requested relief."). 
Second, a post-conviction petition in Utah ought not always be brought "within one 
year after the case of action accrues." This is because Utah courts are always 
constitutionally empowered, at any time, to reexamine an unconscionable conviction. 
$*> Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 258, 1998 Utah Lexis 63, *3, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 
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18 (Utah 1998); Renn, 904 P.2d at 682 ("the power of a Utah court to issue a writ [in 
whatever form] is constitutional in nature and may be exercised when the 
circumstances of the particular case warrant relief."); && also State v. Mohi, 901 
P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995)("Utah is free to provide broader constitutional protection 
for its citizens than required by federal constitution."). 
Third, even under the Utah post-conviction statutes, a defendant asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel, for example, could raise his claim at any time. Set 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-35a-104, 106; then Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 
(Utah 1989); Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). Further, the district court 
may excuse late filing under the statute upon good cause shown. See Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-35a-107f3). 
Moreover, in Utah, once a district court decides a matter on the merit, it is 
presumed that late filing of a petition or motion was explicitly excused upon good 
cause show. S*> Julian, 1998 Utah Lexis 63, *3, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. In a 
criminal post-conviction defendant could successively collaterally challenge a 
conviction upon showing the existence of any fundamental unfairness in the 
conviction. Sm Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989); *» *&o Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-35a-101 (1998) (authorizing habeas corpus review on ineffectiveness of 
counsel and other grounds); Utah R. Civ. 65B (authorizing habeas review on any 
ground); Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (holding that writ of coram ne&xs was available in 
Utah). 
In the present case, Petitioner's post-conviction petition is premised primarily on 
the fact that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered, on the equitable relief of 
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fairness and denial of effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was misadvised by 
his counsel that he would not be deported as a result of his guilty plea and conviction. 
Petitioner acknowledges that, as today, September 26, 2007, more than a year have 
passed since the district court sentenced him on April 11, 1997. Petitioner also 
recognize that he did not file then any motion to withdraw his plea and did not file 
any direct appeal. On November 13, 2006, however, Petitioner filed his 
memorandum in support of motion to vacate judgment and withdraw plea on the 
grounds that the trial court failed to strict compliance with Rule 11(e), Utah R. of 
Crim. Proc, when he entered his guilty plea and the assistance rendered him by 
defense counsel was ineffective and thus a violation of his constitutional and statutory 
rights. {&& Record in the post-conviction case [which is the matter on appeal] as Rl-
24). On December 18, 2006, Third District Court Judge Demo Himonas entered a 
ruling which stated that the motion was in substance a petition for post-conviction 
relief. Therefore, the motion was filed as a civil petition for post-conviction relief, as 
case no. 060920152. The same day, the post-conviction court entered an order which 
directed the State to file a response on or before December 27,2006. 
In its Brief of Appellant, Respondent alleges that the post-conviction court did not 
provide a copy of the petition as required by Rule 65C(h), Utah R. of Civ. Proc. 
Respondent argues that without a copy of the petition, the State was unable to 
respond, or even determine what case petitioner Colin was challenging. And without 
knowing what case Colin was challenging, the State could not request a copy of the 
underlying criminal case. Further, Respondent asserts that the state requested a copy 
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of the petition and filed a motion for enlargement of time to respond to the petition 
within 30 days after receipt of the petition, S^ Brief of Appellant at 4-5. 
In this sole point, Petitioner refer this Court of Appeals to review the record of the 
criminal case [docket in case # 971900070] filed by Respondent as Addendum "D" 
which did not reveals any submission by the Respondent in the matter of enlargement 
of time to respond to the petition. Therefore, Petitioner asks this Court of Appeals to 
reject the Respondent's argument that he filed a motion for enlargement of time to 
respond to the petition within 30 days after receipt of the petition and therefore the 
motion to dismiss could not state the facts of the criminal case, and could not respond 
in full to the merits of the issues raised in the petition. SQQ Brief of Appellant at 5. 
As addressed above, the petition is timely brought after Petitioner became aware of 
the legal grounds for the petition. The law provides that any delay on defendant's 
part is measured from the time he became aware that the actual imposition of 
immigration consequences was imminent. In other words, a post-conviction petition 
in Utah ought not always be brought 'Svithin one year after the case of action 
accrues," This is because Utah courts are always constitutionally empowered, at any 
time, to reexamine an unconscionable conviction. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 
258, 1998 Utah Lexis 63, *3, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1998); Renn, 904 P.2d at 
682 ('the power of a Utah court to issue a writ [in whatever form] is constitutional in 
nature and may be exercised when the circumstances of a particular case 
warrant... .relief.") . 
The Supreme Court of California ruled in one case exactly similar to the present 
circumstances. Sn People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 183. In 
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Zamudio, the Supreme Court held timely a motion filed March 10, 1998 attacking 
convictions from 1992 and 1997, since it was not until 1997 that the defendant was on 
notice of the actual danger that the "INS" would move to impose immigration 
consequences. In other words, the Court in Zamudio held timely a motion to 
withdraw plea filed six years after the plea had been entered, since it was not until a 
year before that the INS actually began to move against the defendant. ("[A] motion 
is timely if brought within a reasonable time after the conviction actually "may have" 
such [immigration] consequences.") Zamudio, supra. 
Here, the plea was entered on February 28, 1997, ten years ago. However, the true 
actual immigration consequences of the plea, of which Petitioner was misadvised by 
counsel prior to plea, were that the plea would force the "INS" [actually ICE] to strip 
away his lawful permanent resident status forever, and he would certainly be deported 
away from his children, family, friends, home of more than 17 years, employment, 
and property, never to return. See Petitioner's testimony-in-motion to dismiss 
t ranscr ip t pages 4-5 ("M$r counael—he told me I would not get deported...he 
says he know—I know [you are an]immigrant [alien]... I—I don't want to get 
deported...I want to make sure that [what] the consequences about the future when I 
try to be a [U.S.] citizen...or in case they [INS] take my papers away...he told 
me.. .there's not going to be any problem....you know, my home, my family are here, 
my kids and wife, [emphasis supplied] Further, Petitioner stated that "at one point, 
the agreement [prior to plea] on it...[his counsel said] take this, it is a good deal, it's 
not going to be affected with your nationality, it will not be affected [your 
immigration status]...it's a good deal. S& Petitioner's testimony-in-motion to dismiss 
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transcript pages5.6 attached to Respondent's Brief of Appellant as Addendum "E" 
[emphasis supplied]. 
From April 11, 1997 when Petitioner was sentenced for violation of Utah Code 
Ann. Section 76-5-404 until May 24, 2006 when he was ordered deported from the 
United States as a result of this conviction, Petitioner have no knowledge of the 
extreme and harsh immigration consequences that will flow from a plea negotiated in 
ignorance of these consequences. Thus, the facts supporting the Petitioner's petition 
comes from May 24, 2006 date on which he learned of applicable immigration 
consequences to his April 11, 1997 conviction. Petitioner is not responsible for any 
unreasonable delay after his conviction to prepare and file his post-conviction petition 
because all these time he was in ignorance of these consequences. 
On November 13,2006, 6 months after Petitioner was ordered deported, he filed his 
memorandum in support of motion to vacate judgment and withdraw of plea. On 
December 18,2006, Third District Court Judge Deno Himonas entered a ruling which 
stated that the motion was in substance a petition for post-conviction relief and was 
filed as a civil petition for post-conviction relief. On February 27, 2007, the post-
conviction court ruled that the petition was timely and then granted the petition and 
vacated Petitioner's guilty plea. Thus, the latest event supporting the petition [May 
24, 2006] is "within one year after the case of action accrues." S& Julian, 1998 Utah 
Lexis at *3 (stating that one year limitation period to file habeas is suspect under Utah 
Constitution); ** a&o Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-35a-104. 106 ("Under the Utah 
post-conviction statutes, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, for 
example, could raise a claim at any time.") [emphasis supplied]. 
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In his petition, Petitioner did not learn the ineffective assistance rendered to him at 
the time of plea until May 24, 2006, when he was ordered deported from the United 
States as a result of the negotiated plea and conviction entered in ignorance of these 
[deportation, exclusion from admission, and denial of naturalization] consequences. 
Thus, Petitioner's petition -coming less than 6 months after he learned the extreme 
and harsh consequences flowed from his plea of guilty induced by his defense 
counsel's misadvise — is not untimely, and therefore it met the interest of justice 
exception* 
B. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY EVALUATED THE 
RESPONDENT'S PROFFER AND THE PETITIONER'S TESTIMONY 
In its Brief, Respondent argues that the post-conviction court should not have 
proceeded based solely on the State's attorney proffer and petitioner's confusing, 
unsworn statement over the telephone. Further, Respondent alleges the 
credibility of petitioner's claim that he would not have pled guilty if he had 
known he would be deported. iW Respondent's Brief of Appellant at 21. 
Petitioner contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel because his counsel misadvised him regarding the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea and conviction. 
In deciding this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the post-conviction 
court beliefs on the test set out in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 697, 
104, S.Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984). Under the Strickland test, an individual has been 
denied the effective assistance of counsel if: 1) counsel's performance was 
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deficient below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 2) 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. S& $#., State v. Martinez, 
2001 UT 12, || 16,26 P.3d 203. 
This Court of Appeals has held that deportation is a "collateral consequence" of 
conviction. State v. McFadden, 884, P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Thus, "an attorney's failure to inform a client of the deportation consequences of 
a guilty plea, without more, does not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." United States v. Cuoto, 311 F.3d 179, 187 (2nd Or. 2002) 
[emphasis added]; js^ McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305. 
However, a commonly recognized exception to this rule exists when an attorney 
affirmatively misrepresents deportation consequences to his or her client. See 
McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1305 n.3 (noting exception exists but finding it 
inapplicable where attorney entirely failed to advise client on the subject of 
deportation); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) 
(finding counsel ineffective where counsel merely warned defendant there "might 
be immigration consequences to his guilty plea.") [emphasis added]; && a&o 
Roberti v. State, 782 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) ("Affirmative 
misadvise about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the plea."). 
Under this exception, this Court has been concluded that "an affirmative 
misrepresentation by counsel as to deportation consequences of a guilty plea is 
today objectively unreasonable." Cuoto, 311 F.3d at 188. 
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Here, the post-conviction court found that " the petition was timely in that was 
brought within one year of the time that he [petitioner] discovered the problem; 
namely, this issue with respect to the advice he [petitioner] received or didn't 
receive with respect to deportation. So, I think it's a timely - it's a timely petition 
in that sense." £& Reporters Transcript to Motion to Dismiss page 13 attached to 
Respondent's Brief as Addendum "E". 
Continuing with the post-conviction court ruling, the judge stated: "even if it 
weren't, under Adams, the court was supposed to consider the interest of justice 
and try to determine whether there's merit to the petition. It seems to me that the 
argument that he's [petitioner] making is ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
really does, in essence, raise a Constitutional issues; so, the question then comes 
down to whether the cases support the contention that he was denied effective 
assistance. And as I understand those cases, they turn on the question of whether 
he [petitioner] was mis-advised or just not advised. If he [counsel] is told nothing 
about deportation, then he [petitioner] cannot claim that he was given ineffective 
assistance. On the other hand, if he [counsel] was given mis-advise and told, 
don't worry, you won't be deported, then that would fall into the mis-advice 
category and would constitute ineffective assistance. S<& Reporters Transcript 
pages 13-14. 
Following with the post-conviction court reasoning the record reflect: "In this 
case, the State has made a proffer that Mr. Quinlan, if called to testify, would 
testify that he does not remember the specific facts of this case, but that his 
practice would be normally to adhere to the requirements of good counsel. 
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Accepting that proffer and giving it the maximum force that I think it could be 
given, I still don't think it would go to extent of contradicting what I hear over the 
phone, as Mr. Colin's specific recollection of the event and his specific 
recollection of the event is that he was told he would not be deported and he based 
his plea on that advice and he would not have pled otherwise, if he or he would 
not have pled guilty if he had been instructed that there might be immigration 
consequences, which could lead to his deportation. So, given all of that, I find 
that the petition has merit and as a result, I'm going to grant his petition and I'm 
going to vacate his plea of guilty and leave it to the state as to whether or not they 
wish to re-file the Information against him and bring the charges anew. S& 
Reporters Transcript at pages 13-14. 
The record reveals that the post-conviction court stated that "counsel did not 
remember the specific facts of this case but that his practice would be normally to 
adhere to the requirements of good counsel." However, Petitioner was induced to 
pled guilty to Attempted forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-5-404. Petitioner's counsel was aware that 
Petitioner was not a U.S. citizen, had lawful status in the United States and was 
concerned about the potentially adverse immigration consequences he might face 
because of the criminal case. In spite of this awareness, defense counsel failed to 
investigate the immigration consequences of his proposed plea and misadvised his 
client about those consequences would be. In fact, Petitioner's counsel assured 
him that in front he had a "good deal" and he would not be deported by accepting 
such plea. Thus, Petitioner was led to enter his plea without any knowledge 
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whatsoever that the conviction would be fatal to his hopes of remaining in the 
United States with his family. Clearly, Petitioner's counsel failed to make the 
most minimal effort to research the immigration consequences his client would 
most certainly suffer from, even though information concerning these 
consequences was ready available then. Rather than consult an immigration 
attorney or any of the written resources of law available concerning the adverse 
immigration consequences, Petitioner's counsel blindly led his client down a 
dangerous legal path from where, as today, Petitioner continue his fighting for 
remain in the United States with his family. Clearly, Mr. Quinlan breached his 
most fundamental duty of "good counsel" to Mr. Colin expectations. Sm 
Petitioner's Declaration in support of petition attached to Respondent's Brief as 
Addendum "F". 
Petitioner was convicted by guilty plea of attempted forcible sexual abuse, a 
third degree felony, and the alleged victim was a minor. See Respondent's Brief at 
pages # 2 "Statement of the case", and #7 "Statement of the facts". 
This crime is considered an "aggravated felony" for immigration purposes. &w 
8 U.S.C. section 1101(a)(43)(A); #* *&o United States v. Padilla-Reves, 247 F.3d 
1158, 1162-63 (11th Or. 2001) (concluding "sexual abuse of a minor", which is 
an "aggravated felony" 'includes acts that involve physical contact between the 
perpetrator and the victim as well as acts that do not'.) Thus, any crime 
punishable as an "aggravated felony" have the most severe consequences under 
immigration law. 
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Furthermore, the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("INA") eliminated all discretion of the immigration courts and enforced their 
powers to deportation of non-citizens convicted of aggravated felonies. 
Under current immigration laws, and considering all the circumstances, 
Petitioner's guilty plea unequivocal constitutes an unavoidable deportation and a 
permanently exclusion from admission to the United States. Sn United States v. 
Amador-Leal 276 F.3d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[I]t is now virtually certain that 
an aggravated felon will be [deported]."); 8 U.S.C. section 1182(a)(6)(B). 
Therefore, by advising Petitioner he "not be deported" and forced him to taken 
it's "good deal", Petitioner's counsel affirmatively misrepresented the 
unavoidably deportation consequences of petitioner's plea, and thus Mr. 
Quinlan's "performance was deficient below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment." $& State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12 at || 16. 
Petitioner must also met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, which 
requires a showing "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. 
Petitioner stated on his declaration in support of his petition for post-conviction 
relief that: "I did not know the immigration consequences until the DHS 
commenced deportation proceedings against me based on my conviction.. .if I had 
known about the consequences of my plea, I would have never agreed to enter it 
since there are much serious consequences than actual penal consequences. I 
would have willing to accept a plea agreement subjecting me to additional time in 
custody if it would protected my legal status and the privilege to remain in the 
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United States with my family or I would have taken my case to trial since I felt 
and the record corroborate that I had a triable case from the beginning. $& 
Petitioner's Declaration attached to Respondent's Brief as Addendum "F". 
Clearly, the Petitioner's declaration support his petition for post-conviction 
relief and did not is confusing or contradictory in essence. Petitioner stated that 
"he not have pleaded guilty" had he know "he would be deported". Instead, he 
asserted that he "would have have taken his case to trial since he felt ....that he 
had a triable case from the beginning". 
In sum, this Court of Appeals must conclude that: 1) Petitioner's petition is 
timely, 2) it met the interest of justice exception, and 3) due to the maximum 
benefit given to Respondent's proffer, the post-conviction court properly 
adjudicated the State's claims and merits in this case. 
Because both litigants received due process of law, and the case was resolved in 
the merits of the petition, the interest of justice will survive over the Respondent's 
allegations. 
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FILED PiSTRICT f 0VR 
Third Judicial District 
APR 0 3 2007 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAjraOUNTY 
Deputy CI 
JUAN CARLOS COLIN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINAL ORDER 
Case No. 060920152 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
ORDER 
This Court hereby ORDERS: 
1) That the petition for post-conviction relief filed by petitioner Juan Carlos Colin is 
Granted, for the reasons, facts, and conclusions set forth in the Order Granting the Petition. 
2) Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial 
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court having 
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-110. 
3) The Court Orders that the State promptly take any necessary action to notify I.C.E. 
and cooperate in releasing the Petitioner. 
DATED this ^ day o e ^ O j 2007. 
COURT 
1 CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE 
OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENTj 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COL 
LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UT| 
DAI 
Judg6/Jj^hnT^ul Kenned^ 
Thira Judicial District 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court of appeals should affirm the decision of 
the post-conviction court and uphold the well-reasoned determination of the Third 
District Judge Honorable John Paul Kennedy Presiding. 
Respectfully Submitted, this 25th Day of September, 2007. 
Juan Carlos Colin 
4545 Arthenton Dr. #122 
Taylosville, Utah 84123 
Petitioner/Appelle in/*o Ae. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Juan Carlos Colin, hereby certify that one (1) true and correct copy of the 
attached PETITIONER'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF APPELLANT in 
the case of JUAN CARLOS COLIN v. STATE OF UTAH. Case No. 20070211-CA 
was served/delivered upon the Attorney General via U.S. Mail with postage prepaid 




Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Respectfully Submitted, this 25th Day of September, 2007. 
Juan Carlos Colin 
4545 Arthenton Dr #122 
Taylosville, Utah 84123 
Petitioner/Appellee inyo*. :oM. 
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